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Personal Taxes and Corporate Investment
Frédéric Herold
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Abstract
In this thesis, I present empirical evidence on the effect of personal taxes on firm-level investment. Exploiting a cross-country
panel that consists of 40,608 firms from a total of 115 countries in the period 1999-2013, I employ a linear regression model
in which I regress five different definitions of the personal tax wedge against capital investment of firms. I find that the
average investment response of firms strongly depends on the definition of the personal tax wedge. My baseline regression
reveals that, if the pure personal tax rate increases, firms on average show a positive capital investment response. That is, if
firms cannot shift the economic burden of personal taxes to other stakeholders, an increase in personal taxes, ceteris paribus,
increases the factor price of labour and thus exerts higher pressure on corporate profits. Profit-maximising firms therefore
counteract this pressure by (partially) substituting the more expensive input factor labour by capital, increasing their capital
investment. This effect, however, does not hold true for alternative definitions of the personal tax wedge that additionally
include social security contributions. Likewise, I obtain mixed results when testing for cross-sectional variation in capital
investment responses arising from differences in relative market power, the ability to substitute input factors, and financial
constraints. In this context, my thesis provides empirical evidence on the effect of personal taxes on investment behaviour at
the firm level and thus adds to current literature, which mainly considers the effect of personal taxes on aggregate investment,
economic growth, and total factor productivity.
Keywords: investment; personal tax; tax wedge
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, a substantial amount of litera-
ture has evolved which extensively discusses the effect of
corporate taxes (e.g., Auerbach et al., 1983; Djankov et al.,
2010; Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Giroud and Rauh, 2017;
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky, 2016), payout taxes (e.g., Al-
stadsæter et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2013; Chetty and Saez,
2010; Yagan, 2015), and consumption taxes (e.g., Jacob
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et al., 2018) on investment behaviour of firms1. The discus-
sion on the effect of personal taxes on firm-level investment,
however, is much more fragmentary and less diverse. That
is, although previous literature on personal taxes does exist,
evidence on the direct effect of personal taxes on firm-level
investment is surprisingly scarce. For instance, one set of
studies exclusively relies on macroeconomic data and draws
unclear conclusions about the effect on aggregate invest-
1Dobbins and Jacob (2016) provide a comprehensive overview of studies
which discuss a negative effect of corporate taxes on investment, both for the
macro level (e.g., Auerbach et al., 1983; Djankov et al., 2010) and the direct
effect on firm-level investment (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Ljungqvist
and Smolyansky, 2016). Similarly, the effect of payout taxes on investment
levels in the light of agency issues (e.g., Alstadsæter et al., 2017; Chetty and
Saez, 2010) and the allocation of investment between cash-rich and cash-
poor firms (e.g., Alstadsæter et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2013; Yagan, 2015),
although with mixed empirical results, has been extensively investigated.
Also, Jacob et al. (2018) provide recent empirical evidence on the effect of
consumption taxes on firm-level investment which complements previously
inconclusive findings on the macroeconomic level (e.g., Alesina et al., 2002;
Arnold et al., 2011).
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ment and economic growth2 (e.g., Lee and Gordon, 2005).
Other studies, by contrast, attempt to complement these
macro-level findings by estimating the effect on total factor
productivity (e.g., Arnold et al., 2011) or by employing the
q approach (e.g., Alesina et al., 2002) but they show no sta-
tistically significant, robust effect on firm-level investment3.
Thus, it appears that previous studies have unclear implica-
tions for investment responses on the firm level which creates
a substantial gap in tax research.
This neglect is astonishing when considering the impor-
tance of personal taxes for fiscal budgets and their practical
relevance for input factor decisions of firms. First, personal
taxes are a major source of tax revenues on the fiscal level and
on average contribute to approximately 25% of tax revenues
in OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2017) which emphasises the significance
of personal taxes as a policy instrument. Second, and even
more severely, if firms cannot fully pass the economic bur-
den of personal taxes onto other parties (e.g., Dyreng et al.,
2017; Jacob et al., 2018), personal taxes can, ceteris paribus,
distort input factor decisions on the firm level, and thus the
optimal factor mix of firms by increasing the factor price of
labour. When abstracting from productivity differences be-
tween factors, this ‘price increase’ is expected to reduce the
attractiveness of the input factor labour in favour of capital,
and thus likely creates pressure to substitute the more ex-
pensive input factor labour by additional capital. Consider-
ing these substantial implications, it is imperative for policy
makers and managers to understand the effect of personal
taxes on investment behaviour of firms.
This thesis therefore aims at bridging this gap by pro-
viding empirical evidence on the effect of personal taxes on
firm-level investment and the magnitude of this effect. For
this, my empirical analyses exploit a cross-country panel of
non-financial, non-transportation, non-telecommunication,
non-utility firms in 115 countries over the 1999–2013 period.
My estimation strategy is threefold. First, following Jacob
et al. (2018), I employ linear probability models to identify
“country-level determinants of . . . [personal] tax changes”
(Jacob et al., 2018, p.15). Second, my baseline model in
which I account for “observable firm and [country-level]
characteristics” (Alstadsæter et al., 2017, p.75) and include
firm- and deficit-interest-payment-cluster-industry-year fixed
effects estimates the average investment response. Third, I
test for cross-sectional variation in investment responses to
analyse the impact of differences in firm characteristics such
as market power, the ability to substitute input factors, and
financial constraints on the responsiveness of capital invest-
2Lee and Gordon (2005) admit that “the aggregate information reported
. . . is insufficient to draw . . . conclusion[s] about . . . links between [personal]
tax[es] . . . and growth” (p.15).
3Arnold et al. (2011) investigate the effect of personal taxes on industry-
level entrepreneurial activity and total factor productivity but fail to do so
for firm-level investment. Likewise, Alesina et al. (2002) “estimate a q type
of investment equation that links investment to . . . profits” (p.572) but they
solely rely on aggregate measures such as “investment of the business sector
. . . [and] capital stock” (p.578).
ment. In all tests, five different definitions of the personal
tax rate (i.e., one pure personal tax rate and four different
specifications including social security contributions) are em-
ployed to investigate whether investment responses of firms
differ depending on the definition of the personal tax wedge.
Interestingly, my empirical results reveal exactly that. In
my baseline regression, for instance, I can only validate a
positive average response of capital investment for the pure
personal tax rate (although the effect size is smaller than
for other taxes) whereas specifications including social se-
curity contributions are statistically insignificant. This find-
ing supports my proposed mechanism of firms facing higher
pressure to substitute labour by capital but does not con-
firm predictions about social security contributions having
the same economic effect on factor decisions as the pure tax
rate. This picture slightly changes when testing for cross-
sectional variation in investment responses where results are
partially ambiguous. For instance, if firms have low market
power, investment reacts more strongly compared to the av-
erage investment response in case of the pure personal tax
rate, but the response mostly reverses (i.e., investment re-
acts less strongly) when including social security contribu-
tions in the personal tax wedge. Results also appear to be
mixed when testing for differences in the ability to substitute
labour by capital and financial constraints. Hence, my thesis
contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence
on the direct relationship between the personal tax rate and
investment behaviour at the firm level, and thus illustrates
the impact of policy instruments on input factor decisions and
the optimal factor mix of firms.
The remaining sections of this thesis are structured in
the following way. In section 2, the theoretical background
is explained based on which I derive four hypotheses (i.e.,
one predicting the average investment response and three
investigating cross-sectional variation in capital investment
responses). Section 3 presents my data, methodology, and
summary statistics on variables used in my baseline regres-
sion. Furthermore, I conduct a pre-analysis and check for
sufficient variation in personal tax changes in section 4 on
which I base my baseline regression and subsequent analy-
ses of cross-sectional variation in section 5. I then test for
robustness of my baseline results in section 6. Finally, my
conclusion is presented in section 7.
2. Theoretical Background: Model and Hypothesis De-
velopment
2.1. Optimal Input Factor Mix and Personal Tax Wedge
According to economic theory, the “production function
[of firms] has two input factors, capital and labor” (Dobbins
and Jacob, 2016, p.8). However, since firms are an invest-
ment vehicle of their shareholders (Alstadsæter and Jacob,
2012), and thus are assumed to be profit-maximising enti-
ties, they must decide on the optimal mix of these factors to
produce a certain output at minimal costs. Following Pindyck
and Rubinfeld (2018), the optimal factor mix is determined
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Figure 1: Personal Tax Wegde
Figure 2: Substitution Response After a Personal Tax Increase
by the two criteria (a) factor productivity4 and (b) price per
input factor unit. That is, the more output a factor can pro-
duce within a certain time (i.e., the more productive a factor)
for given factor price, the higher its contribution for the gen-
eration of revenues, and thus the more attractive the input
factor. Likewise, the lower the price of a factor for a given
productivity level, the higher the profit margin per unit of
output produced, and hence the more attractive the input
factor. Thus, when combining these two criteria, the optimal
factor mix is a function of the relative attractiveness of input
factors which can be expressed as the ratio of factor produc-
tivity to factor price5.
Personal taxes, however, can change the optimal factor
mix of firms. As illustrated in Figure 1, the “tax wedge the-
ory” (Becker et al., 2013, p.5; see also Alstadsæter et al.,
2017; Jacob et al., 2018) predicts that personal taxes drive a
wedge between the factor price of labour paid by firms (cL)
and the net wage of employees (wn). Thus, unless firms
4Factor productivity is defined as the level of output which can be pro-
duced by an input factor within a given time.
5For simplicity, I assume that the relative attractiveness of input factors
only changes the mix of input factors whereas the level of output generated
remains constant irrespective of the input factor mix. I also abstracted from
other determinants of factor decisions, e.g., the availability of input factors
(which is assumed to be reflected in the price) and the state of technology.
can fully shift “the economic burden, or incidence, [of per-
sonal taxes]” (Dyreng et al., 2017, p.6) to consumers via
higher market prices or workers via lower net wages (Dyreng
et al., 2017), personal taxes increase the factor price of labour
while labour productivity remains constant6, and thus they
reduce the attractiveness of labour relative to capital.
Consequently, personal taxes exert pressure on profits,
and thus force profit-maximising firms to substitute the rel-
atively more expensive factor labour by additional capital7.
Figure 2 visualises this relationship by using a simplified P&L
structure which assumes firms to bear part of the personal
tax incidence.
To conclude, personal taxes are expected to discriminate
the input factor labour in favour of the input factor capital,
and thus distort input factor decisions of firms8. Based on
6I expect the higher factor price of labour not to be offset by increases
in labour productivity (although this could be assumed in a world without
personal taxes in which employees are paid a wage equal to their marginal
productivity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2018)). Thus, ceteris paribus, a tax-
induced increase in the factor price of labour results in a lower attractiveness
of labour relative to capital.
7I assume that labour and capital are, on the margin, substitutes (e.g.,
Dyreng et al., 2017; Jacob et al., 2018). Please refer to hypothesis one in
section 2.2 for a detailed explanation. For a substitution response to be eco-
nomically reasonable, capital is also assumed to have a productivity greater
than zero, and firms are assumed to keep their output level constant.
8In a wider sense, personal taxes can be a variable not just including the
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this, I develop four hypotheses on the investment behaviour
of firms. In hypothesis one, I predict the average investment
response. Hypotheses two, three, and four, then extend the
scope of my model and capture cross-sectional variation in
the responsiveness of capital investment.
2.2. Hypothesis Development
Hypothesis 1: On average, if the economic bur-
den of a personal tax increase is (partially) borne
by firms, capital investment responds ambigu-
ously.
Assuming supply and demand to be neither fully elastic nor
inelastic (e.g., Jacob et al., 2018) in the labour market, the
economic burden of a personal tax increase is shared between
firms and employees (i.e., higher labour costs for firms, lower
net wage for employees). At the firm level, this exerts higher
pressure on profits, and thus forces profit-maximising firms
to reduce costs incurred by their deployment of input factors.
That is, since an increase in personal taxes directly increases
the factor price of labour, firms would unambiguously try to
reduce their labour intake in their production function to cut
costs.
The effect on capital investment, however, is ambiguous
and depends on whether labour and capital, on the margin
(i.e., in marginal factor decisions), are complements or sub-
stitutes. Two channels of investment responses are hence
plausible (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017). First, like for labour,
firms can respond by reducing their capital investment, too.
This would allow them to “maintain their [optimal]mix of in-
put factors” (Dobbins and Jacob, 2016, p.4), for which labour
and capital, even on the margin, would be treated as com-
plements. Second, by contrast, capital investment of firms
could increase. Such a response would occur if labour and
capital could be partially (i.e., to a small extent) substituted
despite their overall complementarity, and thus both input
factors would be substitutes on the margin. The second chan-
nel is empirically supported by Dyreng et al. (2017) showing
that labour and capital, on the margin, can be substitutes.
Hypothesis 2: After an increase in personal taxes,
firms with low market power vis-à-vis their stake-
holders show greater responsiveness in capital
investment.
Intuitively, the personal tax incidence borne by firms (and
ultimately shareholders) likely determines the magnitude of
investment responses. That is, the greater (smaller) the eco-
nomic burden on firms, the greater (smaller) the pressure
to substitute labour by capital. Yet, previous literature sug-
gests that “shareholders might not bear the entire economic
top marginal income tax rate on labour income, τρ , but also labour-related
costs such as social security contributions which drive a wedge between wg
and wn. These additional labour costs are effectively part of the gross wage,
wgn, and thus are expected to have the same economic effect on firm-level
investment as the pure personal tax rate τρ . Although these labour-related
costs are no taxes, social security contributions will nevertheless be included
in the definition of the personal tax wedge in section 5 to check whether they
empirically have the same economic effect on investment.
burden [of personal taxes] . . . [since a] firm’s market power
allows it to pass the [economic] burden to [stakeholders
such as suppliers,] workers, or consumers” (Dyreng et al.,
2017, p.1), and thus cross-sectional variation in investment
responses may result from differences in the relative market
power of firms. Since market power is a function of mar-
ket demand elasticity (in the case of consumers) and supply
elasticity (in the case of suppliers/workers) (e.g., Dyreng
et al., 2017; Jacob et al., 2018), I present two cases in a par-
tial equilibrium setting which show the relationship between
market power and firm-level investment9. Also, the model
of the profit-maximising firm is assumed (e.g., Dyreng et al.,
2017) that will try to reduce the economic burden imposed
by personal taxes.
Conceptually, it does not matter onto which stakeholder
the economic burden of a personal tax increase is shifted as
investment responses of firms are unambiguous in both sub-
sequent cases. First, I consider the market power of firms
vis-à-vis their employees on the cost side10. In this case, mar-
ket power depends on the elasticity of labour supply (e.g.,
Dyreng et al., 2017; Jacob et al., 2018). That is, the more
elastic (inelastic) the labour supply (e.g., due to high (low)
education levels (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017; Fuest et al., 2018)
and correspondingly high (low) labour mobility), the lower
(higher) the ability of firms to freely set wages, and thus the
lower (higher) their ability to shift the economic burden of
a personal tax increase to employees11. Subsequently, this
exerts higher (lower) pressure on profits, and thus increases
the (creates less) pressure to substitute the more expensive
factor labour by capital which, in turn, causes investment of
firms with low (high) market power to respond more (less)
strongly12 than the average investment response. Second, I
consider the market power of firms vis-à-vis their consumers
which is a function of the elasticity of market demand on their
revenue side (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017; Jacob et al., 2018).
That is, the more (less) elastic the market demand (e.g.,
due to the availability of substitutes (Jacob et al., 2018), the
lower (higher) the ability of firms to shift the economic bur-
den of a personal tax increase to consumers through higher
prices. Thus, this translates into higher (creates less) pres-
sure to substitute labour by capital and is expected to result
in a stronger (weaker) investment response if firms have low
(high) market power.
9For illustration purposes, I abstract from a general equilibrium setting
in which “firm[s] can simultaneously shift [their personal] tax burden to
[multiple stakeholders]” (Dyreng et al., 2017, p.10).
10Literature suggests that “results are essentially the same [if] firms
. . . pass on taxes to . . . suppliers through [lower] input . . . prices instead of
passing [them] on . . . to workers [through lower wages]” (Jacob et al., 2018,
p.2).
11Alternatively, it could be argued that the power of unions influences the
ability of firms to shift the economic burden to employees. However, union
power belongs to the discipline of bargaining literature (e.g., Katz, 1993)
from which I abstract in my model for simplicity.
12The meaning of more strongly depends on the direction of the average
effect. That is, if the average effect is positive (negative), I expect a stronger
increase (decrease) in investment if firms have low market power.
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Hypothesis 3: After an increase in personal taxes,
capital investment responds more strongly if
firms can more easily substitute labour by capi-
tal.
As illustrated in Figure 2, an increase in personal taxes
exerts stronger pressure on firms to substitute the more ex-
pensive input factor labour by capital13. This does, however,
not imply that firms are able to substitute both factors to the
same extent, and thus cross-sectional variation in investment
responses across firms may arise from differences in the abil-
ity to substitute labour by capital (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017).
Intuitively, the degree of input factor substitutability is influ-
enced by two elements: (a) The knowledge-intensity of the
factor labour, and (b) the importance of labour and capital
for the generation of value added (i.e., output produced).
First, knowledge-intensive labour tasks such as R&D are
difficult to automate, and thus the more knowledge-intensive
the factor labour, the more difficult it is to substitute labour
by capital. Consequently, firms for which knowledge and
innovation (i.e., R&D) are core of their business model
(e.g., consultancies or pharma firms) have a high share of
knowledge-intensive labour, and thus have a lower ability
to substitute labour by capital, if they can do so at all14.
Second, the higher the importance of an input factor in a
firm’s production function, and hence for the generation of
value added (i.e., output produced), the more difficult it is
to substitute this input factor if output is to be kept constant.
For example, if labour (capital) is highly productive and
therefore important for the generation of output, the same
output can, if at all, only be produced by a disproportionally
high amount capital (labour), and hence it is relatively more
difficult (easier) to be substituted by labour by capital on
the margin. Thus, the greater a firm’s ability to substitute
labour by capital, the more strongly investment is expected
to respond since firms likely show a smaller (greater) sub-
stitution response towards capital if labour is knowledge
intensive (capital is important for the generation of output).
Hypothesis 4: After an increase in personal taxes,
financially constrained firms which strongly rely
on internal cash flows for investment exhibit a
more negative investment response.
Besides differences in relative market power and the
ability to substitute input factors, previous literature sug-
gests that cross-sectional variation in investment responses
can also result from “differences in the availability of inter-
nal funds” (Jacob et al., 2018, p.5) across firms. That is, if
internal cash flows are the marginal source of finance, in-
vestments in cash-constrained firms (i.e., firms with limited
13This assumes labour and capital to be substitutes on the margin.
14In this hypothesis, I abstract from recent technological developments in
the field of artificial intelligence. These developments potentially increase
the ability of firms to automate knowledge-intensive labour since they in-
creasingly enable the factor capital to perform knowledge-intensive tasks
(e.g., in R&D). Thus, knowledge-intensive labour could be more easily au-
tomated (and substituted by capital) in future.
internal resources) are likely more prone to decreases in in-
ternal cash flows than investments in cash-rich firms (i.e.,
firms with abundant internal resources) (e.g., Dobbins and
Jacob, 2016; Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Fazzari et al.,
1988; Jacob et al., 2018). Thus, assuming firms to bear part
of the personal tax incidence, an increase in personal taxes
is predicted to reduce profits, and thus internal after-tax
cash flows and investments more strongly if firms are cash-
constrained and “heavily [rely] on internally generated cash
flows for investment” (Jacob et al., 2018, p.5). Thus, despite
higher pressure to substitute labour by capital, this effect is
expected to translate into a more negative investment re-
sponse of financially constrained firms15 as their availability
of internal resources is more strongly affected.
3. Data, Methodology, and Summary Statistics
The data used in this thesis have largely been provided
by the WHU chair of Business Taxation and stem from four
main data sources. First, firm-level data on listed companies
over the 1997–2013 period were retrieved from the Com-
pustat Annual North America and Global database. Second,
tax policy data were extracted from handbooks published
by major auditing and tax advising firms such as KPMG,
PwC, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte and are available from
1999–2013. Third, information on macroeconomic and gov-
ernance indicators follow the World Bank definition and
originate from the World Bank website for all countries in
the dataset. Fourth and finally, I retrieved additional data on
personal taxes from the OECD tax database from 2000–2013
to include social security contributions in the definition of
the personal tax wedge.
Prior to merging datasets, I amended the data in sev-
eral ways to increase the coverage of some variables. For
instance, I added new data on Tobin’s q with higher cover-
age across firms which were provided by the WHU chair of
Business Taxation16. Similarly, I replaced missing data en-
tries of the variable Income Group to increase the number of
observations for the income-group-cluster used in robustness
tests of my thesis17. In addition to the datasets provided by
15This corresponds to lower investment levels of financially constrained
firms compared to the average investment response, irrespective of the di-
rection (i.e., coefficient) of the average effect. Since the average effect in
hypothesis one is expected to be ambiguous (i.e., both β1 < 0 and β1 > 0
are plausible), the investment response of financially-constrained firms is
therefore predicted to be more negative (and not greater or smaller than
the average effect as such a statement requires a clear prediction of the di-
rection of the average effect).
16The definition of Tobin’s q is the same as in Jacob et al. (2018) (i.e.,
the market value of equity over total assets). It was necessary to add new
data on Tobin’s q since the variable Market Value (denoted by mkvalt) in the
provided Compustat data suffered from poor coverage. Attempts to estimate
this variable via share price * number of shares as in the originally provided
Compustat dataset only increased the coverage marginally.
17This adjustment was carried out in two steps. First, I manually re-
placed missing values for Argentina, Jamaica, New Zealand, and Nigeria
based on World Bank data. Second, I merged new data from the World
Bank website for all other 66 countries with missing data entries to the
#3.1_full_codes.dta dataset. Missing countries, for instance, included Tai-
wan, Cyprus, Monaco, and Paraguay.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
This table displays summary statistics of all main variables from 1997 to 2013. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for variables on the country level. Panel
B summarises descriptive statistics for variables on the firm level. Please refer to Table A.1 in the appendix for variable definitions. Notes: Summary Statistics
of all firm-level variables in Panel B correspond to the winsorised version of the respective variable to eliminate the effect of outliers on my results.
Variable N Mean Standard 25th Median 75th
Deviation percentile percentile
Panel A: Country-level Variables
Tax Policy Variables
Personal Tax 345,333 0.3972 0.0938 0.3500 0.4000 0.4641
Corporate Tax 345,954 0.3215 0.0742 0.2700 0.3300 0.3900
Consumption Tax 325,864 0.1073 0.0627 0.0519 0.1000 0.1700
Payout Tax 345,333 0.1621 0.1027 0.1000 0.1500 0.2488
Accelerated Depreciation 345,954 0.8109 0.3916 1 1 1
LCB 345,954 0.4334 0.4955 0 0 1
Group Taxation 343,328 0.5521 0.4973 0 1 1
Progressive 345,954 0.6302 0.4828 0 1 1
Extended Tax Definitions
67% Earner 201,247 0.3685 0.1017 0.3198 0.3439 0.3939
100% Earner 201,247 0.4018 0.0936 0.3423 0.3883 0.4361
133% Earner 201,247 0.4420 0.0918 0.4093 0.4336 0.4770
167% Earner 201,247 0.4275 0.0984 0.3525 0.4340 0.4748
Macroeconomic Variables
GDP Growth 363,902 3.5813 3.4689 1.7292 3.1400 5.1472
Ln(GDP per Capita) 363,817 9.6124 1.3841 8.6600 10.4290 10.5557
Inflation 363,902 2.7073 4.3191 0.8477 2.0327 3.7157
Deficit 269,504 -2.6679 3.9788 -4.8523 -3.1779 0.0177
Openness 304,174 0.7266 0.8649 0.2829 0.4831 0.6549
Interest Payments 279,947 0.0225 0.0123 0.0150 0.0230 0.0276
Government Debt 196,624 60.9360 37.7089 40.0881 53.5029 64.0318
Governance Indicators
Voice and Accountability 371,022 0.6717 0.8952 0.3900 1.0100 1.3500
Political Stability 371,017 0.3316 0.8166 -0.2000 0.6000 0.9600
Government Effectiveness 371,006 1.1319 0.7665 0.4000 1.4600 1.7500
Regulatory Quality 371,006 0.9722 0.7837 0.4200 1.1900 1.6200
Rule of Law 371,022 0.9888 0.7968 0.2900 1.3300 1.6100
Control of Corruption 371,006 0.9794 0.9781 0.0500 1.2900 1.8350
Panel B: Firm-level Variables
Investment 321,987 0.0719 0.1096 0.0139 0.0357 0.0803
Cash Holdings 338,232 0.1269 0.2727 0.0020 0.0203 0.1129
Profit 337,817 0.0268 0.2106 -0.0036 0.0517 0.1141
Leverage 369,749 0.0933 0.1563 0.0007 0.0112 0.1167
Ln(Sales Growth) 323,754 0.0876 0.4335 -0.0460 0.0730 0.2182
Sales Growth 287,128 0.4841 1.7148 -0.0637 0.1468 0.4652
Loss 370,210 0.2984 0.4576 0 0 1
Tobin’s q 279,446 1.4997 3.5907 0.3319 0.6837 1.4016
Size 388,193 6.5558 3.0442 4.3872 6.3843 8.4709
the WHU chair, I retrieved and added data on geographic re-
gions following World Bank definition from the World Bank
website to construct a region-cluster later in my robustness
section.
After merging datasets, I conducted general data clean-
ing to eliminate implausible observations. For instance, I
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dropped firms with SIC codes 4000 to 4999 (i.e., utility, trans-
portation, and telecommunication firms) and 6000 to 6999
(i.e., financial firms) since these subsets of firms likely ex-
hibit different investment behaviour which could distort my
results18. In addition, I excluded observations for which firms
had negative total assets or for which total assets were un-
available. Likewise, I limited my baseline sample to obser-
vations with positive sales and cash holdings19. To elimi-
nate bankrupt firms, I also dropped observations with a value
of Common/Ordinary Equity smaller than or equal to zero
and which possess a Leverage ratio greater than or equal
to one. The sample was further limited to observations for
which the macroeconomic variables GDP per capita, Open-
ness, Government Debt, and Interest Payments were not neg-
ative to eliminate further implausible observations. Addi-
tionally, I conducted specific data cleanings tailored to my
research question. For instance, I only included observations
for which capital expenditure was greater than or equal to
zero to restrict my analyses to firms with non-negative invest-
ment. Similarly, I dropped implausible tax rates with values
less than zero or higher than one. I also conducted specific
data cleanings in my cross-sectional variation analyses (e.g.,
by dropping negative (i.e., implausible) net PPE when test-
ing for different factor substitutability across firms), but these
cleanings were carried out after my baseline tests and thus do
not affect the composition of my baseline sample or robust-
ness tests. Following my data cleanings, I converted firm-
level variables which were denoted in currencies other than
U.S. Dollar into U.S. Dollar by using the average annual U.S.
Dollar exchange rate in the corresponding year issued by the
WHU Chair of Business Taxation20. In addition, I winsorised
all non-dummy, firm-level variables and their lags below the
1st and above the 99th percentile to reduce the effect of ex-
treme outliers on my results21. Overall, these adjustments
result in a baseline sample comprising 42,670 firms located
in 115 countries from 1997–201322. Table 1 presents sum-
mary statistics on all variables used in my baseline specifica-
18Asker et al. (2011), for instance, argue that financial firms and utility
firms are subject to different regulation affecting their investment policy.
Similarly, companies in the transportation and telecommunication sector
mostly tend to be formerly state-owned and, due to their business model,
I expect them to possess a substantial amount of fixed assets with corre-
spondingly high capital expenditure. It is therefore plausible to assume that
these subsets of firms differ substantially in their investment behaviour com-
pared to all other firms included in the sample (and thus could distort my
results).
19Please note that cash holdings are defined as the sum of cash holdings
and short-term investments because short-term investments are assumed to
be as liquid as cash. Please refer to Table A.1 in the appendix for exact
variable definitions.
20Some firm-level variables such as EBIT, sales, or total assets were already
denoted in USD. Therefore, I excluded these variables from the currency
conversion process.
21I refrained from winsorising my tax policy variables and country-level
data from the World Bank since these are official statistics. Similarly, the
appended data on Tobin’s q were already winsorised and hence excluded
from the winsorisation process.
22Since data on tax policy variables are only available from 1999–2013,
the sample is ultimately restricted to 40,608 firms from 1999–2013 in subse-
quent regressions. If social security contributions are included in the defini-
tion after these adjustments.
4. Pre-Analysis: Linear Probability Model and Variation
in Personal Tax Rate Changes
Prior to running regressions on corporate investment be-
haviour, my data on personal tax rates must fulfil two funda-
mental conditions. First, my independent variable of interest
(i.e., the personal tax rate) must exhibit a sufficiently large
degree of variation in my sample. Otherwise, my causal in-
ference would be limited to a few selected events and could
barely be generalised to all countries available in my dataset
(Jacob et al., 2018). Fortunately, my cross-country panel of
115 countries provides a solid source of tax rate variation as
personal taxes change 217 times from 1999 to 2013 (thereof
76 increases and 141 decreases). Even when abstracting
from personal tax changes of less than two percentage points,
121 changes can still be observed (thereof 43 increases and
78 decreases). Consequently, my dataset shows a sufficiently
large variation of the personal tax rate and fulfils the first
condition.
Second, changes in the personal tax rate must be exoge-
nous to allow for clear causal inference. This is especially crit-
ical since my baseline regression assumes changes in the per-
sonal tax rate to be entirely exogenous. Otherwise, I would
only “observe a spurious correlation” (Jacob et al., 2018,
p.15) instead of a causal relationship between personal taxes
and investment. Analogously to Jacob et al. (2018), I there-
fore address endogeneity concerns by running a linear prob-
ability model showing whether changes in the personal tax
rate are related to the business cycle or other economic con-
ditions. In the model, I include the six macroeconomic deter-
minants GDP Growth, Ln(GDP per capita), Inflation, Deficit,
Openness, and Interest Payments on government debt as re-
gressors23 (Jacob et al., 2018). Likewise, I also use coun-
try fixed effects and region-year fixed effects to capture time
invariant effects at the country level and limit comparable
countries to their counterparts within the same World Bank
region (Jacob et al., 2018).
Table 2 displays results of my linear probability model.
In columns (1) and (2), I model whether macroeconomic
determinants affect the probability of personal tax changes
by more than 2.0 percentage points. As the dependent vari-
able, I use a dummy equal to one if personal taxes are in-
creased (column 1) or decreased (column 2). In addition,
tion of the personal tax wedge, the sample further shrinks to 25,874 firms as
data on social security contributions are only available for OECD countries
from 2000–2013.
23In the excel file 2. LPM Results Edited.xls, three specifications of this
model were used. In specification (1), I additionally included Government
Debt as a regressor but abstracted from it in specifications (2) and (3).
Also, specifications (1) and (3) are restricted to the same 410 observations,
whereas specification (2) considers 743 observations. I therefore reported
specification (2) to avoid distorted results due to a poor coverage of Gov-
ernment Debt. This is supported by similar results (both magnitude and
significance) in specifications (1) and (3) indicating that omitting Govern-
ment Debt is unlikely to cause an omitted variable bias.
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Table 2: Linear Probability Model Results
This table presents results of my linear probability model. In columns (1) and (2), I model macroeconomic determinants which affect the probability of
changes in the personal tax rate by more than 2.0 percentage points. The magnitude of these changes are modelled in columns (3) to (5). Please refer to
Table A.1 in the appendix for definitions of explanatory variables. I further include country fixed effects and region-year fixed effects in all specifications.
This table also reports robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Probability of Magnitude of
Tax Increase Tax Decrease Tax Change Tax Increase Tax Decrease
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP Growth -0.0025 -0.0054 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0116
(0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.0070)
Ln(GDP per Capita) -0.0948 0.1222 0.0114 0.1483 0.2556
(0.1236) (0.2334) (0.0218) (0.1906) (0.2674)
Inflation 0.0010 0.0038 0.0000 0.0007 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0027)
Deficit -0.0015 0.0092 -0.0005 -0.0130* 0.0072
(0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0004) (0.0068) (0.0078)
Openness 0.0879 -0.1711 -0.0024 0.0332 0.0022
(0.1100) (0.1574) (0.0187) (0.1406) (0.1820)
Interest Payments 1.0763 0.9006 0.1096 5.0101* -0.5837
(1.6420) (1.9015) (0.1674) (2.9223) (3.4237)
Observations 743 743 743 743 743
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared -0.012 -0.048 -0.106 0.134 0.073
the magnitude of all 217 personal tax changes is modelled in
the remaining columns. In column (3), the dependent vari-
able is denoted by the change in the personal tax rate. In
columns (4) and (5), I interact this change with a dummy
for a tax increase and tax decrease, respectively (e.g., Jacob
et al., 2018).
Overall, based on my dataset, changes in the personal
tax rate appear to be mostly exogenous since four macroe-
conomic variables are not significant. In addition, the prob-
ability and the magnitude of personal tax changes seem to
be mostly unaffected by economic conditions except for the
magnitude of personal tax increases. This is indicated by sig-
nificant coefficients for Deficit and Interest Payments in col-
umn (4). That is, if the budget deficit increases (e.g., in re-
cessions), policy makers tend to increase personal taxes less
strongly, thereby limiting the adverse effect of personal taxes
on economic growth. Furthermore, policy makers tend to
increase personal taxes more strongly to finance higher in-
terest payments which, for example, could be a result of for-
merly high budget deficits. Considering these results, I define
quartiles of Deficit and Interest Payments for each year and
create a deficit-interest-payment-cluster-industry-year fixed
effect for my baseline regression. This assures that firms in
countries with personal tax changes are compared to a con-
trol group which is subject to similar economic conditions in
terms of budget deficit and interest payments.
5. Main Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, I estimate the causal effect of a change in
the personal tax rate on investment at the firm level. To ac-
complish this, I structured this section into two main parts.
First, the average effect on investment is analysed in my base-
line model using the cross-country panel of 115 countries
from 1999 to 2013 (2000 to 2013 for social security contri-
butions). Second, I examine cross-sectional variation in in-
vestment responses due to cross-sectional differences in firm
characteristics such as (a) market power vis-à-vis stakehold-
ers, (b) different degrees of input factor substitutability, and
(c) the presence of financial constraints.
5.1. Baseline Regression
To estimate the average effect of personal taxes on cor-
porate investment behaviour, I construct the following linear
regression model based on the estimation method of ordinary
least squares:
Invi, j,t =α0 + β1Personal Tax j,t +δ1Γ j,t +δ2T j,t+
δ3Φi, j,t−1 +αi +αg,k,t + εi, j,t (1)
My dependent variable is Investment of firm i located in
country j in year t. Consistent with previous literature (e.g.,
Jacob et al., 2018), I approximate my dependent variable
with capital expenditure over lagged total assets. My inde-
pendent variable of interest is the personal tax rate which is
denoted by Personal Tax j,t . I employ five different definitions
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of the personal tax rate. First, the top marginal income tax
rate on labour income is used to analyse the effect of the pure
personal tax rate on investment. Second, I extend this defi-
nition and include social security contributions. Doing so, I
consider four different income classes of employees in OECD
countries, which are expressed as a percentage of the average
wage earned in a respective country-year24.
To account for variables which could affect investment
other than personal taxes, I include three control vectors in
my baseline regression. First, I account for country-level fac-
tors in vector Γ j,t which comprises the macroeconomic vari-
ables GDP Growth, Ln(GDP per Capita), Inflation, Deficit,
and Interest Payments as well as the governance indicators
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Ef-
fectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of
Corruption as defined by the World Bank (e.g., Jacob et al.,
2018). Variables with poor coverage such as Openness or
Government Debt, however, were excluded to increase the
number of observations in my regression25. Second, my con-
trol vector T j,t contains a set of tax policy variables includ-
ing Accelerated Depreciation, LCB, Group Taxation, and Pro-
gressive26 analogous to Jacob et al. (2018). To address con-
cerns that changes in the personal tax rate coincide with
changes in other tax rates, I additionally include other tax
rates such as Consumption Taxj,t, Payout Taxj,t, and Corpo-
rate Taxj,t in the tax policy variable vector T j,t (e.g., Jacob
et al., 2018). Doing so enables me to isolate the effect of
personal tax changes on firm-level investment. Third and fi-
nally, I include control variables on the firm level via vector
Φi, j,t−1. In this vector, I account for Cash Holdings, Profit,
Leverage, Ln(Sales Growth), Tobin’s q, Size, and Loss anal-
ogous to previous investment literature27 (e.g., Baker et al.,
2003; Cummins et al., 1996; Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Jacob
et al., 2018). All firm-level controls are lagged by one period
to eliminate concerns about endogeneity (Dobbins and Ja-
cob, 2016).
Furthermore, my baseline model includes two fixed
24These alternative definitions follow the definition of the OECD tax
database and are conceptually no taxes. However, I nevertheless expect so-
cial security contributions to have the same economic effect on investment
as the pure personal tax rate.
25Please refer to Table 1 in section 3 for an overview of the coverage of
main variables. My baseline results are robust to including Openness as an
additional control variable when using the deficit-interest-payment-cluster-
industry-year fixed effect of my baseline specification. Please refer to the
excel file 3. Baseline Results Edited.xls for detailed results.
26Dreßler and Overesch (2013), for instance, discuss that LCB and Group
Taxation influence investment behaviour of firms. Besides, I expect Accel-
erated Depreciation and Progressive to affect investment decisions and risk-
taking of firms, respectively. A dummy for loss carry forwards has not been
included in my model as all countries allow for loss carry forwards in the
sample period.
27This set of firm-level controls is included for several reasons. Cash Hold-
ings and Profit are used since cash-rich or more profitable firms invest more
due to a higher availability of internal resources (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob,
2016; Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988; Lamont, 1997).
Likewise, smaller firms are expected to have better opportunities for invest-
ment (e.g., Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Dobbins and Jacob, 2016). To
measure growth opportunities, I also include Ln(Sales Growth) and Tobin’s
q. (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Jacob et al., 2018). Besides, a dummy for
effects. Firm fixed effects αi , for instance, capture time-
invariant factors at the firm level which potentially affect
investment behaviour (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Ja-
cob et al., 2018). Likewise, I include [group]-industry-year
fixed effects αg,k,t , where [group] is a substitute for the
deficit-interest-payment-cluster and individual industries are
denoted by the subscript k28. Hence, firms experiencing a
personal tax change in country j are compared to a control
group which is operating in the same industry k and subject
to similar economic conditions in terms of budget deficit
and interest payments in year t. Since firms in country j
are subject to the same tax system, my baseline regression
employs heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at the country level.
Recalling hypothesis one in section 2, I expect the aggre-
gate effect of personal taxes on capital investment to be am-
biguous. That is, although an increase in personal taxes un-
ambiguously increases the factor price of labour, thus mak-
ing labour relatively more unattractive, capital investment
of firms can respond in two ways. First, firms could treat
labour and capital as complements. Thus, firms would re-
duce capital investment analogously to the more expensive
factor labour to maintain their optimal input factor mix as de-
termined by their production function (Dobbins and Jacob,
2016). Second, previous studies demonstrated that labour
and capital can be substitutes on the margin (e.g., Dyreng
et al., 2017). That is, firms partially substitute the more ex-
pensive factor labour by capital, and hence increase their cap-
ital investment even though taxes increase29. I thus make no
prediction on the sign of my coefficient β1 as β1 < 0 and β1
> 0 are both plausible.
Table 3 presents my baseline results. In column (1), I use
the top marginal income tax rate on labour income as my in-
dependent variable of interest. Columns (2) to (5) employ
extended definitions of the personal tax rate which include
social security contributions. Surprisingly, capital investment
responses depend on the definition of personal taxes. That
is, although coefficients of personal taxes are mostly positive
across all five specifications, only the coefficient of the pure
personal tax rate (hereafter: pure tax rate) is significant30.
Vice versa, all specifications including social security contri-
butions on average have no effect on firm-level investment
due to insignificant coefficients. These results have two im-
plications. First, for the pure tax rate, my results confirm
empirical findings of prior studies (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017)
losses is added to respect that firms with negative pre-tax income are likely
to invest less (Dobbins and Jacob, 2016).
28My baseline results are not robust to replacing [group]-industry-
year fixed effects by region-industry-year fixed effects and income-group-
industry-year effects. Please refer to Table 7 in section 6 for results.
29Consistent with my hypothesis development, I abstract from productiv-
ity differences between the two input factors as corresponding estimates are
difficult to obtain (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017).
30Consistent with previous literature on corporate taxes (e.g., Dobbins and
Jacob, 2016), dividend taxes (e.g., Alstadsæter et al., 2017) and consump-
tion taxes (e.g., Jacob et al., 2018), coefficients on other tax rates are almost
always significant and their sign is negative.
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Table 3: Baseline Results
This table presents my regression results on investment behaviour from 1999 to 2013. The dependent variable is Investment. I use five different specifications
of the personal tax rate. In column (1), the top marginal income tax rate on labour income is used. In Columns (2) to (5), this definition is extended and
includes social security contributions for different income classes of employees in OECD countries for the 2000-2013 period. Please refer to Table A.1 in
the appendix for definitions of independent variables. I further include firm fixed effects and [group]-industry-year fixed effects in all specifications, where
[group] is a substitute for the Deficit-Interest-Payment-cluster. This table also reports robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal Tax 0.0367*
(0.0213)
67% Earner 0.0003
(0.0367)
100% Earner 0.0129
(0.0243)
133% Earner -0.0268
(0.0308)
167% Earner 0.0258
(0.0327)
Corporate Tax -0.0471 -0.0958*** -0.0981*** -0.0970*** -0.0973***
(0.0355) (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0319) (0.0309)
Consumption Tax -0.4256*** -0.5755*** -0.5758*** -0.5673*** -0.5823***
(0.0604) (0.0835) (0.0826) (0.0819) (0.0851)
Payout Tax -0.0094 -0.0165* -0.0172* -0.0172* -0.0182*
(0.0140) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0094)
Cash Holdings 0.0200*** 0.0176** 0.0176** 0.0176** 0.0176**
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068)
Profit 0.0196* 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Leverage -0.0438*** -0.0415*** -0.0415*** -0.0415*** -0.0415***
(0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Ln(Sales Growth) 0.0032** 0.0033* 0.0033* 0.0033* 0.0033*
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Tobin’s q 0.0020* 0.0032** 0.0032** 0.0032** 0.0032**
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Size -0.0186*** -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0172***
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Loss -0.0089*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0081***
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Accelerated Depreciation 0.0023 0.0037* 0.0035* 0.0041* 0.0034
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0020)
LCB 0.0057* 0.0124*** 0.0128*** 0.0120*** 0.0124***
(0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0026)
Group Taxation -0.0053 0.0039 0.0036 0.0040 0.0039
(0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0074)
Progressive -0.0035 -0.0060 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0054
(0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0039)
GDP Growth 0.0009*** 0.0011** 0.0011** 0.0011** 0.0011**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ln(GDP per Capita) -0.0120 -0.0958*** -0.0978*** -0.0990*** -0.0940***
(0.0165) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0288)
Inflation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
(Continued)
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Table 3—continued
Deficit 0.0010** 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Interest Payments 0.2739 0.5349** 0.5299*** 0.5660*** 0.5226***
(0.1862) (0.1983) (0.1796) (0.1966) (0.1816)
Voice and Accountability -0.0116* -0.0297** -0.0295** -0.0285* -0.0297**
(0.0063) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0151) (0.0144)
Political Stability 0.0056 0.0195*** 0.0188*** 0.0192*** 0.0201***
(0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0038)
Government Effectiveness 0.0125 0.0234*** 0.0232*** 0.0226*** 0.0235***
(0.0086) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0056)
Regulatory Quality 0.0054 0.0101 0.0112 0.0090 0.0117
(0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0078)
Rule of Law -0.0073 -0.0263* -0.0268* -0.0248* -0.0271*
(0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0138)
Control of Corruption 0.0099 0.0157** 0.0168** 0.0171** 0.0151**
(0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0069)
Observations 158,760 125,582 125,582 125,582 125,582
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Group)-Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594
showing that labour and capital are substitutes on the mar-
gin. Second, firm-level investment responses depend on the
definition of the tax wedge, and thus I cannot confirm ex-
pectations about social security contributions having a sim-
ilar economic effect as the pure tax rate. Yet, I would like
to caution that the second implication may result from the
composition of my data since data on social security contri-
butions are only available for OECD countries. It is therefore
advisable to further test this result in future studies once ad-
ditional data are available.
Based on these findings, a one-percentage-point increase
in the pure tax rate on average increases capital investment
by 0.037 percentage points (pp) of lagged total assets31
which confirms that, when abstracting from productivity dif-
ferences between factors, personal taxes increase the pres-
sure on firms to substitute labour by capital on the margin.
Compared to the sample average of my dependent variable
Investment, this implies a relative increase of 0.51%32. For
better interpretation, I convert this relative change into an
implied elasticity of 0.2033 suggesting that personal taxes
are of high economic relevance for investment decisions
31In Table 3, I obtain a beta of 0.0367 for the average effect of personal
taxes on investment. However, all tax rates in my dataset are defined be-
tween zero and one (e.g., a rate of 37% is denoted by 0.37). Thus, I multi-
plied the tax rate by 100 (i.e., 0.37 * 100 = 37) to interpret the beta with
respect to a one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate (e.g., from 37%
to 38%). Simultaneously, I divided my beta by 100 to keep the term β1
* Personal Tax j,t constant, thus obtaining a transformed beta of 0.000367
which equals an average change in investment by 0.0367pp.
32The relative change of investment is defined as the quotient (β1 / Invµ)
of the transformed beta (i.e., 0.000367) and the sample average of Invest-
ment. In numbers, this implies (0.000367 / 0.0719) * 100% = 0.51%.
33The implied elasticity is defined as the percentage change of investment
over the percentage change of the personal tax rate (%∆ Inv / %∆ Personal
even though their magnitude is, in absolute terms, smaller
compared to corporate taxes (between –0.4 and –0.5 as in
Giroud and Rauh (2017)) and consumption taxes (between
–0.24 and –0.29 as in Jacob et al. (2018); numbers are based
on the draft from December 2017). Besides, since the sign
of β1 is positive, the effect of personal taxes on firm-level in-
vestment works in the opposite direction compared to other
tax rates34.
Overall, my baseline results confirm that on average
labour and capital are substitutes on the margin even though
an effect is only observed for the pure tax rate. In the follow-
ing, I therefore test for cross-sectional variation in investment
responses due to differences among firms in their (a) mar-
ket power vis-à-vis stakeholders, (b) substitutability of input
factors, and (c) financial constraints to check whether my
baseline results also hold for hypotheses two, three, and
four.
5.2. Cross-Sectional Variation I: Market Power vis-à-vis
Stakeholders
Based on Dyreng et al. (2017) and Jacob et al. (2018),
variation in capital investment responses can result from dif-
ferences in the relative market power of firms, and thus their
ability to shift away the economic burden of personal taxes
from their shareholders. This can be explained by different
labour supply (market demand) elasticities faced by firms.
Tax). Following Jacob et al. (2018), I therefore divide the relative effect by
the percentage increase of the personal tax rate. In numbers, this implies
0.51% / (0.01 * 100% / 0.3972) where 0.3972 is the sample average of the
pure personal tax rate.
34For completeness, relative effects and implied elasticities of all five spec-
ifications are presented in Table A.2 in the appendix.
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That is, the more elastic a firm’s labour supply (market de-
mand), the lower the ability to pass on the personal tax in-
cidence to workers (consumers), and hence the more of the
economic burden of personal taxes is borne by firms, and ul-
timately, shareholders. This likely translates into higher pres-
sure to substitute the more expensive factor labour by capital.
Hence, higher personal taxes exert higher pressure on
profits, and thus are expected to affect investment respon-
siveness more strongly if firms have low market power. Fol-
lowing previous literature, I proxy a firm’s market power by
its EBIT margin35 (e.g., Jacob et al., 2018; Lerner, 1934) and
add the dummy Low Profit Margin which is equal to one
if a firm is below the median EBIT-to-sales ratio in a given
country-year36 (e.g., Jacob et al., 2018). I subsequently in-
teract Low Profit Margin with all tax policy variables (i.e.,
Personal Tax j,t and control vector T j,t) to infer whether firms
with low market power respond more strongly compared to
the average investment response.
Results are presented in Table 4. Interestingly, it ap-
pears that investment responsiveness of firms with low mar-
ket power is ambiguous and varies with the definition of the
tax wedge, too. In column (1), for instance, the interaction
with the pure tax rate has a positive coefficient suggesting
that firms with low market power increase their capital in-
vestment by 0.027pp of lagged total assets more strongly af-
ter an increase in personal taxes compared to the average in-
vestment response37. In relative terms, this corresponds to a
substantial increase in investment responsiveness by 110%38
relative to the average investment response if firms have low
market power. Consequently, it seems that firms facing highly
elastic labour supply (market demand) bear more of the eco-
nomic burden of personal taxes through lower profits, and
thus are exposed to higher pressure to substitute labour by
capital, which confirms my hypothesis.
Surprisingly, however, the direction of the marginal effect
mostly reverses if social security contributions are included in
the definition of the tax wedge, thereby contradicting my hy-
35I acknowledge that labour supply (market demand) elasticity is influ-
enced by factors such as education of workers (availability of substitutes)
(e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017; Jacob et al., 2018) which could serve as alterna-
tive proxies for market power. However, I abstracted from these factors for
two reasons. First, these factors are not available in my dataset. Second,
a firm’s profit margin can be interpreted as the result of market power and
thus is a conceptually correct proxy.
36Alternatively, I could identify low-margin firms within the same indus-
try using a country-industry-year distribution for Low Profit Margin. How-
ever, this would marginalise firms with relatively low profit margins in high-
margin industries as low-margin firms although, in absolute terms, they are
high-margin firms and vice versa. Thus, I ignore differences in the prof-
itability of firms within the same industry and only account for differences
in profitability within the same country. This also applies to subsequent tests
in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
37This finding is in line with previous studies suggesting that labour and
capital can be substituted on the margin (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017).
38I compute the relative effect to better interpret the magnitude of the
marginal effect. Following Jacob et al. (2018), the relative effect is defined
as the combined effect (i.e., average plus marginal effect) over the average
effect minus one. In numbers this implies ((0.0267+0.0242)/0.0242) – 1.
This calculation also applies to all other relative effects presented in subse-
quent analyses.
pothesis. The negative coefficients in columns (5) and (9)
indicate that investment of firms with low market power re-
sponds less strongly by 0.022pp and 0.020pp of lagged total
assets, respectively, compared to the average investment re-
sponse. This equals a considerable decrease in investment re-
sponsiveness by 82% and 49% if firms have employees earn-
ing the average wage and 167% of the average wage, respec-
tively. It therefore appears that, once social security contri-
butions are considered, reduced profits translate into less re-
sources available for investment, and thus capital investment
of firms with low market power responds less strongly (Jacob
et al., 2018). Yet, the negative marginal effect cannot be gen-
eralised to all income classes of employees since interaction
terms in columns (3) and (7) are insignificant39.
Finally, all results hold when comparing high- versus low-
margin firms within the same industry in the same country
(i.e., by replacing deficit-interest-payment-cluster-industry-
year fixed effects by country-industry-year fixed effects).
Thus, my results are likely not caused by “broader policy
changes . . . or other unobservable characteristics [within in-
dustry k] in . . . country [j in year t]” (Jacob et al., 2018,
p.21). To conclude, relative market power determines the
personal tax incidence borne by firms and consequently their
capital investment responses to personal tax changes. Yet,
investment responsiveness of firms with low market power is
ambiguous and depends on the definition of the tax wedge.
That is, if the pure tax rate is used, firms with low relative
market power show stronger investment responsiveness to
personal tax changes compared to the average investment
response. Conversely, investment of firms with low market
power mostly responds less strongly compared to the aver-
age investment response once social security contributions
are considered in the tax wedge40.
5.3. Cross-Sectional Variation II: Substitutability of Labour
and Capital
Although an increase in personal taxes increases the fac-
tor price of labour, and thus the pressure to substitute labour
by capital, the degree of factor substitutability likely varies
across firms (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017). I therefore examine
cross-sectional variation in investment responsiveness due
to differences in the substitutability of input factors. There
are two explanations for this phenomenon. First, the more
knowledge-intensive the factor labour, the more difficult it
is to substitute labour by capital since knowledge-intensive
labour (e.g., R&D) is mostly difficult to automate. Thus,
firms with knowledge-intensive labour are expected to sub-
stitute labour by capital to a lower degree, if at all. Second,
the higher the importance of an input factor in a firm’s pro-
duction function, and hence for the generation of output,
39Results for all interaction terms are robust to using a tercile or quartile
split. See excel file 4. Market Power Results Edited.xls for results.
40Please note that I did not interpret average effects in this section since
my research question exclusively examines whether low-margin firms re-
spond differently from the average investment response. This also applies
to subsequent analyses in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
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the more difficult it is to substitute this input factor. For in-
stance, if labour (capital) is highly productive and therefore
important for the generation of output, firms likely show a
smaller (greater) substitution response from labour to capital
as labour is relatively more difficult (easier) to be substituted
by capital on the margin. Thus, I expect firms to show
a smaller (greater) investment response if labour is knowl-
edge intensive (capital is of high importance for the gener-
ation of output). Since proxies for labour suffer from poor
coverage41, I limit the empirical analysis to my second pre-
diction and define the dummy High K-to-Output42 which is
equal to one if a firm is in the top quartile of the net-PPE-
to-sales distribution in a given country-year. Subsequently, I
interact each tax policy variable with High K-to-Output to es-
timate whether investment of firms responds more strongly
if capital is important for the generation of output.
Table 5 presents my empirical results. Interestingly, the
interaction term of High K-to-Output and the pure tax rate is
insignificant whereas all specifications which include social
security contributions in the tax wedge show (highly) signifi-
cant, positive interaction terms. Thus, when including social
security contributions in the personal tax wedge, responsive-
ness of capital investment increases between 0.042pp and
0.073pp of lagged total assets (depending on the income
class of employees) compared to the average investment re-
sponse if capital is important for the generation of output in
firms, which is in line with my hypothesis. The economic
magnitude of this is substantial for two reasons. First, in
columns (5) and (9), investment responds more strongly to
personal tax changes by factor ten and almost factor seven,
respectively, if capital is important for output generation.
Second, the positive marginal effect outweighs the negative
average effect in columns (3) and (7) which results in a posi-
tive net effect of 0.055pp and 0.018pp of lagged total assets,
respectively43. Finally, the significance and magnitude of my
results are mostly robust if country-industry-year fixed effects
are included, and thus unobservable country-industry-year
characteristics likely do not influence my results (Jacob et al.,
2018). The sole difference in this case is that the marginal
effect in column (6) is about half the magnitude and thus
insignificant44.
To summarise, the positive marginal effect is consistent
41My baseline sample only has 128,016 observations for R&D expenditure
if values for the personal tax rate are not missing. Using R&D expenditure as
a proxy for labour could therefore limit the interpretation of results towards
a smaller subset of firms.
42High K-to-Output is an alternative proxy for the importance of capital
for output generation since estimates for factor productivities are difficult
to obtain. Intuitively, I assume that a high proportion of fixed assets on a
firm’s balance sheet corresponds to a greater importance of capital in the
production function, and thus for the generation of output. Yet, factor deci-
sions are based on the ratio of factor productivity to factor price, and hence
I acknowledge that it is conceptually reasonable but practically difficult to
include a proxy for factor productivity.
43I did not compute the relative effect in this case since the marginal effect
outweighs the average effect, and thus the relative effect cannot be inter-
preted. Instead, I present the net effect which equals the sum of the average
effect and the marginal effect.
44Results are robust to using a tercile split but differ if a median split is
with my hypothesis when including social security contribu-
tions in the tax wedge, and the magnitude of this marginal
effect is substantial. In other words, responsiveness of cap-
ital investment increases if capital is of high importance for
the generation of output in firms. Yet, my hypothesis does
not hold for the pure tax rate since, for this definition of the
personal tax wedge, investment does not respond differently
compared to the average investment response if capital is im-
portant for the generation of output in firms.
5.4. Cross-Sectional Variation III: Financial Constraints
Recalling hypothesis four in section 2, cross-sectional
variation in investment responses can arise from “differences
in the availability of internal funds” (Jacob et al., 2018,
p.5). That is, if internal cash flows are the marginal source
of finance for investments, investments in cash-constrained
firms are likely more prone to decreases in internal cash flows
than investments in cash-rich firms (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob,
2016; Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988;
Jacob et al., 2018). In other words, when personal taxes
increase, internal cash flows, and thus the availability of re-
sources for investment is expected to decrease more strongly
if firms face financial constraints and heavily use internal
funds for investments (Jacob et al., 2018). Hence, despite
higher pressure to substitute labour by capital, these firms
are expected to show a more negative investment response
(i.e., lower investment levels) compared to the average in-
vestment response. Based on Jacob et al. (2018), I include
the dummy Low Cash Flow in my regression which is equal
to one if a firm is in the bottom quartile of the cash-holdings-
to-total-assets distribution in a given country-year. I also
interact each tax policy variable with Low Cash Flow as done
in previous analyses.
Results in Table 6 indicate that investment responsiveness
of financially constrained firms depends on the definition of
the tax wedge as well. For example, the interaction term in
column (1) has a positive but insignificant coefficient imply-
ing that investment of financially constrained firms does not
respond differently than the average investment response if
the tax wedge only comprises the pure tax rate, and thus my
hypothesis does not hold for this specification45. Contrar-
ily, when including social security contributions in the tax
wedge, interaction term coefficients are mostly negative and,
in columns (3) and (7), significant. Thus, if firms employ
workers earning 67% and 133% of the average wage, invest-
ment of financially constrained firms responds more nega-
tively by 0.026pp and 0.024pp of lagged total assets, respec-
tively, compared to the average investment response, which
used. In the latter case, interaction term coefficients are mostly positive
but only significant in columns (9) and (10). This indicates that the median
may not be an ideal threshold value. See excel file 5. Substitutability Results
Edited.xls for results.
45Interestingly, the average effect coefficient of the pure tax rate in Table 6
has a similar magnitude as in my baseline specification, and this result holds
for all quantile splits. Besides, the p-value of this average effect is 0.107,
and thus close to being significant at the 10% level.
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confirms my hypothesis. The economic magnitude of this is
substantial in two ways. First, investment responsiveness of
financially constrained firms increases by 112% relative to
the negative average effect in column (7). Second, in column
(3), the negative marginal effect considerably outweighs the
positive average effect yielding a combined negative net ef-
fect of –0.021pp of lagged total assets. Like in section 5.3,
however, these results cannot be generalised across all in-
come classes of employees since interaction terms in columns
(5) and (9) are insignificant, and thus investment of finan-
cially constrained firms does not respond differently than the
average investment response in these specifications46. Lastly,
the significance and magnitude of my results are robust if
country-industry-year fixed effects are included, and thus my
results are not caused by unobservable country-industry-year
characteristics (Jacob et al., 2018).
To conclude, financially constrained firms only respond
more negatively if social security contributions are consid-
ered in the tax wedge, but this result cannot be generalised
to all income classes of employees. Thus, my results are par-
tially in line with results obtained for corporate taxes (e.g.,
Dobbins and Jacob, 2016) and consumption taxes (e.g., Ja-
cob et al., 2018).
6. Robustness of Baseline Results
There are two main concerns about my baseline results.
First, it could be argued that these are driven by the choice
of my control group (i.e., comparable countries) in my cross-
country panel. In other words, the deficit-interest-payment-
cluster derived in my linear probability model may not be
an ideal fixed effect although it compares firms in one coun-
try to a control group of firms in countries with similar
economic conditions in terms of budget deficit and interest
payments. Second, one could doubt whether my baseline
specification accounts for all relevant variables which have
an impact on firm-level investment. Thus, my baseline re-
sults could arguably suffer from omitted variable bias. To
address these concerns, I modify my baseline regression in
two ways. First, I define control groups differently by re-
placing deficit-interest-payment-cluster-industry-year fixed
effects by region-industry-year fixed effects and income-
group-industry-year fixed effects. Doing so, I group compa-
rable countries in seven geographic regions and four income
groups as defined by the World Bank. Second, I include
Openness as an additional country-level control which I pre-
viously omitted in my baseline due to poor coverage.
Table 7 displays results of my robustness test. Overall,
it appears that my baseline results are not robust to modi-
fications of fixed effects, and thus, highly dependent on the
set of comparable countries used as a control group. Specif-
ically, I observe two patterns. First, when employing region-
industry-year fixed effects, all coefficients are positive, but
46Results are robust to using a tercile or median split. Please refer to the
excel file 6. Fin Constraints Results Edited.xls for detailed results.
their magnitude and significance differ substantially from my
baseline results. For instance, magnitudes of the average ef-
fect of the pure tax rate and the 100% Earner have substan-
tially decreased, and the average effect of the pure tax rate
becomes insignificant. Contrarily, all other definitions of per-
sonal taxes become (substantially) more positive, and in case
of the 167% Earner, statistically significant. Thus, it can still
be proved that labour and capital are substitutes on the mar-
gin, but this only holds statistically for the 167% Earner. Sec-
ond, the sign of β1 fully reverses (i.e., turns negative) for all
personal tax definitions when using income-group-industry-
year fixed effects. However, the hypothesis that labour and
capital are complements on the margin cannot be proved
since all coefficients are statistically insignificant across all
specifications in which income-group-industry-year fixed ef-
fects are used.
Importantly, these results are not driven by the inclusion
of Openness for two reasons. First, results are similar in mag-
nitude and significance if additional country-level controls
are not included but fixed effects are substituted by region-
and income-group-industry-year fixed effects. Second, even
if deficit-interest-payment-cluster-industry-year fixed effects
are not replaced by alternative fixed effects, baseline results
are robust to the inclusion of Openness47. To conclude, my
baseline results appear to be ambiguous since I cannot elimi-
nate concerns that these are potentially driven by the defini-
tion of my control group.
7. Conclusion
In this thesis, I present empirical evidence on the effect
of personal taxes on firm-level investment by exploiting per-
sonal tax changes in my international panel data of 115 coun-
tries from 1999 to 2013. My findings are based on a linear
regression model in which five different definitions of the
personal tax wedge are regressed against capital investment
of firms. Interestingly, my results show that investment re-
sponses differ depending on the definition of the personal
tax wedge. In my baseline regression, firms on average show
a positive capital investment response if personal taxes in-
crease, but this effect can only be validated for the pure per-
sonal tax rate. Likewise, I obtain mixed results when testing
for cross-sectional variation in capital investment responses
due to differences in relative market power, the ability to sub-
stitute input factors, and financial constraints. My baseline
results also vary strongly depending on the control group
used, and thus are not robust to the inclusion of different
fixed effects.
The positive average capital investment response can be
explained by the higher substitution pressure faced by firms.
That is, if firms bear part of the economic burden of personal
taxes, an increase in personal taxes, ceteris paribus, increases
47Tables are not included in this thesis. Please refer to the excel files 3.
Baseline Results Edited.xls and 7. Robustness FE Controls Edited.xls for de-
tailed results.
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the factor price of labour, and thus exerts higher pressure on
corporate profits. Profit-maximising firms therefore counter-
act this pressure by (partially) substituting the more expen-
sive input factor labour by capital. This mechanism, however,
does not explain why including social security contributions
in the personal tax wedge triggers a different capital invest-
ment response of firms compared to the pure personal tax
rate. Yet, since the composition of my data may have caused
this difference, it is advisable to test this result in future stud-
ies once additional data on social security contributions are
available.
Eventually, my results have one potential implication for
managers and policy makers. That is, personal taxes increase
the factor price of labour, and thus affect decisions on the
optimal input factor mix of firms. Further, when abstracting
from productivity differences between factors, this ‘price in-
crease’ likely discriminates the input factor labour, and thus
labour-intensive firms, while favouring the factor capital, and
thus capital-intensive firms. However, since input factor de-
cisions are also a function of input factor productivities, my
results cannot fully confirm this prediction since they only
consider changes in the factor price. It is therefore reason-
able to include estimates for labour and capital productivity
in future studies before making clear policy recommenda-
tions and reform proposals. Thus, the results of this thesis
can rather be understood as a first step towards reaching this
goal and need to be further investigated in future theses.
F. Herold / Junior Management Science 4(1) (2019) 81-100100
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